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THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY: TRANSFORMING LAW
AND GOVERNANCE, by Klaus BosseLmann1
LEE GODDEN 2
"THE CONCEPT OF 'SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT' lost its core meaning some-
where between the 1980s and today."' In response, Klaus Bosselmann in The
Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance seeks to define a
new vision for sustainability in order to transcend the limitations of its earlier
conceptions. He envisages a reinvigorated principle of sustainability as fund-
amental to reformulating environmental law and governance that relates to
sustainability in the spheres of both domestic and international law, as well as
in policy settings. While Bosselmann's book focuses on elucidating sustain-
ability as a legal principle, it is also remarkable as an articulation of the role of
law as an ethical pursuit in modern society.
The Principle of Sustainability thus has relevance for an audience beyond
that of academics, students, and professionals engaged with environmental law,
although these would be the primary target groups. The work speaks to many
general questions about the nature of law. Therefore, it will have appeal in legal
theory fields, as well as multidisciplinary areas centred on environmental phil-
osophy and ethics. It also offers an important contribution to opening debates
about the nature of environmental sustainability in both policy and institutional
settings.
Underpinning the conceptual architecture for sustainability is a jurisprud-
ential analysis that critiques the procedural account of law while adopting a natu-
ral law perspective. However, this perspective is informed by an awareness of
1. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 242 pages.
2. Professor and Director, Centre for Resources, Energy and Environmental Law, Melbourne
Law School, The University of Melbourne.
3. Bosselmann, supra note 1 at 1.
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the practical limits of any appeal to the higher values. Sustainability emerges
as an overarching norm or principle that "calls for development based on eco-
logical sustainability in order to meet the needs of people living today and in the
future. Understood in this way, the concept provides content and direction. It
can be used in society and enforced through law."4
The key argument across the book is that the sustainability principle,
through its prioritization of ecological integrity, has definitive content and
direction. Yet, at times, there is a sense that too much is being claimed for the
sustainability principle as the universal guide to revitalizing environmental law.
Sustainability is asked to bear considerable interpretative weight when it is link-
ing it with liberal humanism, justice, human rights, state trusteeship, and citizen
participation in a resurgent civic space. While the transcendental function of law
should not be ignored, it is a large contention to construe sustainability as the
foundation for reconstituting the liberal legal paradigms that currently govern a
growth-oriented political economy and nation-state autonomy. In effect, sus-
tainability is asked to perform the function of a Grundnormr that sets out the
idealized parameters of the social and biophysical world to be instituted as a legal
order. Despite some concerns as to whether ecological sustainability is up to the
task, the book offers one of the most comprehensive and compelling accounts of
sustainability in contemporary law in its capacity to inform a transition to a
more ecologically-oriented form of law and governance.
In sketching how sustainability might underpin the foundation for the
transformation of environmental law, The Principle of Sustainability commences
with a discussion on the meaning of sustainability, drawing on historical and
contemporary thoughts. These concepts are then juxtaposed by an examination
of how sustainability functions as an overarching principle that prioritizes
ecological concerns. The philosophical analyses in the opening two chapters are
followed by an examination of the parameters of ecological justice. This explo-
ration contrasts with a more traditional, liberal account of justice, discussed in
chapter three, which has been long associated with John Rawls.' Shifting his focus
from ecological justice to rights, Bosselmann addresses the long-standing debate
4. Ibid. at 11.
5. Grundnorm is a concept attributed to Hans Kelsen, a jurist and legal philosopher, and thus
has a specialized legal origin. More widely, it denotes an overarching or basic norm.
6. Bosselmann, supra note 1 at 81-85.
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about the utility of associating human rights with environmental protection in
chapter four, concluding "that human rights ... need to respect ecological bound-
aries."7 Chapter five acknowledges the pivotal role of the nation-state and the
influence of international law in refraining concepts of sovereignty to develop
a model of sustainability and state trusteeship. The sixth (and final) chapter
examines how sustainability can inform a system of environmental governance
that comprises "the various institutions and structures of authority engaged in
the protection of the natural environment."8
I. THE MEANING OF SUSTAINABILITY
Sustainability is characterized as "both simple and complex"9 in the first chap-
ter. Sustainability is simple in that it forms the ultimate limit to human exis-
tence. The idea of limits, while simple in theory, draws on a complex
philosophical and legal understanding of human interaction with nature.1"
Accordingly, Bosselmann recognizes the diversity of influences upon the defi-
nition of sustainability while seeking to discern an essential meaning that can
be differentiated from the term "compromise."" The classic definition of sus-
tainable development that is contained in the Brundtland Report is "devel-
opment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs." 2 Yet, explains Bosselmann, it
is only "meaningful if related to the core idea of ecological sustainability."13
The commonly-held view that we need to balance the needs of people living
today (intragenerational equity) with the needs of people in the future (inter-
7. Ibid. at 143.
8. Ibid. at 175.
9. Ibid at 9.
10. Donald Kelley, "Second Nature: The Idea of Custom in European Law, Society and Culture"
in Donald Kelley, ed., The Writing of History and the Study of Law (London: Variorum, 1997)
at 31.
11. Supra note 1 at 29-30.
12. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987) at 43. This book is often also known as the "Brundfland Report,"
named after the chair of the Commission and former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro
Harlem Brunddand.
13. Supra note I at 11.
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generational equity) is rejected in preference to the effective realization of the
ecological core of sustainabitity. 14
The genesis for ecological sustainability is to be found in many societies.
Such concepts have an ancient lineage, with elements found in areas as diverse
as forestry practices and law, and common property concepts in agricultural
villages. The reference to non-Western legal systems is at times cursory, with
the main emphasis on the development of European law and practice, princi-
pally in Germany.S Given the embedded character of sustainability in many
indigenous and local communities, 16 the author's Eurocentric focus is a little
problematic. However, Bosselmann does acknowledge that Western legal sys-
tems no longer exhibit sufficient levels of sustainability. He separates sustain-
ability from environmental law, declaring the latter to be ecologically ignorant
7
and largely procedural in character. Such a separation may be questioned, as
some scholars see sustainability as suffering from a dilution similar to that of
the term "environment," especially in the deployment of weak sustainability
agendas by governments.
The first chapter concludes by stepping through the international legal
framework for sustainable development, including the distributive justice out-
comes emanating from the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. 8
Bosselmann reiterates his central theme by arguing that all existing treaties, laws,
and legal principles must be interpreted in the light of the sustainability principle
as "guidance for the interpretation of legal norms and sets the benchmark for the
understanding of justice, human rights and state sovereignty. " "
II. PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY
In chapter two, The Principle of Sustainability seeks to define a more precise formu-
lation for the principle of sustainability in order to set the "parameters for the
14. Ibid. at 23.
15. Ibid. at 13-20.
16. See generally Peter Orebech etaL, eds., The Role of Customary Law in Sustainable
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
17. Bosselmann, supra note 1 at 13.
18. Ibid. at 37-41.
19. Ibid. at 41.
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direction and extent of social change."2 In discussing how principles forged in
the interdisciplinary environmental field become legal principles, the analysis
implicitly adopts a specific jurisprudential perspective. Bosselmann sets out a
vision where the primary function of law is to promote fundamental principles
that are given legal effect.21 This tautology of defining legal essence through
its connection with Law has its derivation in jurisprudence, but is associated
with John Austin in the common law.22 Bosselmann also draws a classic dis-
tinction between principles of moral force and those principles exhibiting le-
gal effect, relying primarily on Ronald Dworkin to support his thesis of the
existence of fundamental legal principles.23 In this way, legal principles func-
tion as Grundnorms, or overarching values, to which all other subsidiary princi-
ples and legal rules should adhere. Sufficient "recognition" is the catalyst for
sustainability to take on this fundamental character.2 Sustainability is to be a
"meta-principle" having "interstitial normativity."25 Bosselmann develops a
typology to classify those environmental principles of legal normative force as
distinct from mere policy.
Bosselmann adopts a position reminiscent of European natural law concept-
ions, noting that "[t] he prime responsibility of law is to promote fundamental
principles, often expressed in constitutions ... and ensure the legal process is
reflective of them. If sustainability is perceived as one of such fundamental
principles, the legal process will have to be reflective of it." 26 It is at this point in
The Principle of Sustainability that some difficulties arise. The author insists that
fundamental legal principles are given their form by their reference to essential
constructs, such as justice and equality, to provide certainty to the normative
content. Sustainability, therefore, can only be clearly defined by reference to its
essence in the external values of ecological priority. Of course, that begs the
20. Ibid. at 43.
21. Ibid. at 44.
22. See John Austin, The Province ofJurisdiction Determined (London: John Murray, 1832);
John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or The Philosophy of Positive Law, 4th ed. (London:
John Murray, 1873).
23. Supra note 1 at 47-50.
24. Ibid. at 46.
25. Ibid. at51.
26. Ibid at 63.
812 12009 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
question as to what is ecological priority in any given context, although
Bosselmann does seek to ethically ground its essence."
The core problem of distinguishing law from morals by reference to over-
arching values, which in turn rely on an accepted moral and ethical content,
is not confined to Bosselmann's analysis; this process pervades many "liberal
constitutional" analyses of law. Bosselmann does acknowledge some difficulties
by suggesting that ecological sustainability initiatives should be realistic and have
broad community acceptance. The author also cites specific case studies to give
normative content to ecological sustainability.28 However, some reference to the
literature that offers a critique of liberal jurisprudence may have provided a more
rounded discussion of how sustainability might function as a Grundnorm. Other
possible accounts of law, social, and ecological change are referenced briefly. This
reference is largely to dismiss instrumentalist views that would associate law with
power, and the lack of sustainability with the dominance of particular interests
within the legal system. Bosselmann's further articulation of the principle of
sustainability and its interactions with justice, human rights, state obligation, and
civic participation thus proceeds firmly within the liberal model of law as the
prevailing paradigm in contemporary legal systems.
III. ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE
The third chapter commences with the proposition that "[the principle of sus-
tainability aims to protect ecological systems and their integrity. Its subject matter
is ecological processes. However, social processes determine to what extent and
how ecological systems should be sustained. This way sustainability becomes a
social issue."29 In considering these social issues, Bosselmann identifies two
components of distributive justice: firstly, the fair distribution of the environment
among peoples; and secondly, the "justice" between humans and the environ-
ment.3" With respect to the latter, the book explores an ethical approach, noting
that "[t]he goal Of extending justice to respond to environmental needs has long
27. Ibid. at 52-53.
28. Ibid. at 63-76.
29. Ibid. at 79. See also Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).
30. Supra note 1 at 79.
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occupied theorists."31 Identifying a line of theory based around John Rawls's
identification of human needs, which are built around life sustaining properties
and human health, Bosselmann examines the tensions involved in reconciling
"liberalism's preoccupation with the individual, self-interest and state neutrality
with a commitment to good environmental practice."32 It becomes clear that
reconciling the above interests by extending justice outward from the self-
interested individual has its limitations. Accordingly, ecological approaches are
preferred that ground justice in a concept of "generalizable" (i.e., public) interests,
rather than individual self-interest. The third chapter also considers how ecologi-
cal or interspecies justice 33 can be practically implemented in law by reference to
biotechnology regulation and New Zealand resource management legislation. In
articulating an approach to ecological justice, the author draws on theorists such
Robyn Eckersley, whose arguments, in turn, have resonances from Jurgen
Habermas.3 ' Indeed, in various guises, Habermas and his theories of collaborative
democracy appear often in the succeeding chapters, especially in the final chapter,
in its concern with "ecological citizenship."35
IV. ECOLOGICAL HUMAN RIGHTS
In the 1970s, the limitations that arose out of a focus on the rights of human
individuals, whether or not these individuals may need to respect ecological
imperatives, were some of the central drivers for moving away from a liberal
property- and sovereignty-oriented model to environmental protection.
Bosselmann acknowledges the intersection between human rights and envi-
ronmental protection in both international and national law, but suggests
that each is distinguished by a different value system. In tracing out their different
trajectories, he canvasses whether a human right to the environment is extensive
enough to support a non-human centred articulation of rights.3' He argues that
the human right to the environment might support an initial transition, but that
any sustainability principle must be accompanied by a respect for the intrinsic
31. Ibid. at81.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid. at 99.
34. Ibid. at 87-88.
35. Ibid. at 196-98.
36. Ibid. at 127.
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value of the non-human world. Concepts of respect and obligation can help bridge
the current gap between human dignity and the intrinsic rights of the non-human
world,37 as exemplified in The Earth Charter.38 Yet it is not apparent from the au-
thor's analysis that a full resolution of the respective priorities between human
and non-human rights can be achieved within the liberal paradigm.
V. THE STATE AS ENVIRONMENTAL TRUSTEE
The growing recognition that the state has responsibilities for sustainable devel-
opment has been crucial to the continued expansion of international environ-
mental law since the late 1960s. Chapter fiveexplores the internal and external
role of the state as the central authority in environmental law. The state should
make and enforce rules based on fundamental principles-specifically and most
pertinently, it is argued, the principle of sustainability. Bosselmann's analysis links
sustainability, as a fundamental guiding principle, with constitutionalism. He pro-
vides an example of Germany as an emerging ecological state based around this
idea. The chapter also oudines the redefinition of territorial sovereignty that has
been implemented through international environmental law.39 Ultimately, the
chapter arrives at a redefined legal construct whereby "[t]he incorporation of eco-
logical sustainabiity into the concept of territorial sovereignty creates a fundamental
duty to protect the integrity of the Earth's ecosystems.""0 This duty is foreshad-
owed in the emergence of the concepts of public trusteeship, common heritage,
and guardianship in public international law. Yet, for a truly effective common
concern for the environment across the international community, the concept of
sustainability must be extended to other international regimes, such as trade rules.
VI. GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABILITY
The final chapter focuses on the transformation of institutions to achieve govern-
ance for sustainability, rather than environmental governance. While this dis-
37. Ibid. at 140-41.
38. Earth Charter Associates, The Earth Charter, online: The Earth Charter Initiative: Values
and Principles for a Sustainable Future <http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/content/
pages/Read-the-Charter.html>.
39. Bosselman, supra note 1 at 165-68.
40. Ibid. at 169.
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tinction is subtle, the main purpose in focusing on governance for sustainability
is that it is to be regarded as a central defining feature rather than merely an
"add-on."' 1 The guidelines for reform take inspiration from The Earth Charter,2
which allows Bosselmann to set out how the transformation of key institutions,
such as the United Nations, might occur. 3 The European Union is chosen as an
example to illustrate how states can effectively reorganize their sovereignty to take
into account supranational concerns."
To conclude the chapter, the author examines the actors that would be able
to institute change. The proliferation of non-state environmental actors, such as
environmental non-governmental organizations, is evidence of a growing mo-
mentum toward ecological citizenship. Such citizenship is to serve as the catalyst
for a global sense of responsibility to achieve sustainability that will transcend
local concerns."5 The European experience is seen as a template for global citi-
zenship, with the final sections of the book tracing out viable theories by key
thinkers on how global ecological citizenship could be implemented. The
fundamental basis for global ecological citizenship "is the recognition of non-
human beings as 'fellow citizens,""' as articulated by The Earth Charter principles.
VII.CONCLUSION
Bosselmann's final comments sound a warning whereby, if states do not commit
to ecological leadership, humanity will be destroyed by militant states or the pow-
ers of nature. While the impending limits might be overstated, the arguments
that espouse the need for a fundamental transformation of governance to include
direct and clear sustainability goals are well made. The book makes a significant
contribution by exposing key deficiencies in existing laws and institutions. It
charts a course for sustainability that generally is practical and attainable, and
therefore of particular relevance for public policy analyses at both the domestic
and international levels. Some further discussion of the powerful interests and
barriers that are arranged against the Grundnorm of sustainability, which might
41. Ibid. at 175.
42. Supra note 38.
43. Supra note 1 at 179-86.
44. Ibid. at 187-93.
45. Ibid. at 196-97.
46. Ibid. at 204.
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impede its effective realization in law, may have been beneficial. However, these
minor points need to be set alongside the depth and quality of the analysis in
the book, and its commitment to the fundamental priority that should be ac-
corded to ecological sustainability.
